Abstract
The concept of a cause pervades the entire framework of concepts in terms of which we think of the world. As Ducasse points out, this “is made evident by the very large number of verbs of causation in the language; e.g., to push, to bend, to corrode, to cut, to make, to ignite, to transport, to convince, to compel, to remind, to irritate, to influence, to create, to motivate, to stimulate, to incite, to mislead, to induce, to offend, to effect, to prevent, to facilitate, to produce, etc.” (Ducasse, 1966, p. 141). However, despite intensive philosophical labors, the concept of a cause has stubbornly resisted analysis. The major difficulty has been that talk of causes seems to involve us in a mysterious metaphysical kind of contingent necessity, and hence an account of causation would seem to call for the kind of metaphysical theory which is in disfavor in contemporary philosophy. However, philosophers have been equally suspicious about the metaphysical underpinnings of subjunctive conditionals, and as we have seen, it is possible to give a straightforward non-metaphysical account of them. Furthermore, it seems initially plausible to suspect that causes are intimately bound up with laws and subjunctive conditionals, and as such contain a subjunctive element. Perhaps there is hope that we can analyze the notion of a cause with the help of our newfound understanding of subjunctive conditionals. Such an attempt will be made in this chapter.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Pollock, J.L. (1976). Causes. In: Subjunctive Reasoning. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1500-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1500-4_7
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