Abstract
There exists quite a variety of statements which are in some sense ‘subjunctive’. The best known of these are the so-called ‘counterfactual conditionals’ which state that if something which is not the case had been the case, then something else would have been true. An example is Tf Kennedy had been president in 1972, the Watergate scandal would not have occurred’. Ordinary people use counterfactuals all the time, and philosophers use them freely in ordinary situations. However, when they are being careful, philosophers have traditionally felt uncomfortable about counterfactuals and eschewed their employment in philosophical analysis. Such philosophical squeamishness is on the whole meritorious and results from the recognition that counterfactual conditions have themselves stubbornly resisted philosophical analysis.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Pollock, J.L. (1976). Introduction. In: Subjunctive Reasoning. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1500-4_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1500-4_1
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