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PSA 1974 pp 565-584 | Cite as

Some Current Trends in Philosophy of Science: With Special Attention to Confirmation, Theoretical Entities, and Mind-Body

  • Grover Maxwell
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 32)

Abstract

This discussion will be limited to two main topics, the existence of and our knowledge of unobservable entities, on the one hand, and problems about the confirmation of our knowledge claims (scientific and common sense ones), on the other. Unfortunately, this isn’t much of a limitation; for the topics are so large, and their ramifications and implications are so numerous and run so deep that the most that a brief treatment such as this can accomplish is to hit a few of the high spots and, I hope, to generate a little more interest and activity in the areas in question.

Keywords

Prior Probability True Belief Observational Evidence Inductive Inference Knowledge Claim 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Bibliography

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • Grover Maxwell
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MinnesotaUSA

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