Abstract
We shall assume that the objects of belief are or correspond to sentences. These sentences should not be thought of as uninterpreted, they are assumed to have determinate meanings. We understand a sentence to be much like what logicians have traditionally referred to as a proposition; it is the bearer of truth or falsity, the intended object of thought, what is contemplated in an assertoric judgment, the ontent of an assertion, and so on.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Hintikka, J., Cohen, R.S., Davidson, D., Nuchelmans, G., Salmon, W.C. (1976). Logic and Probability. In: Vickers, J.M. (eds) Belief and Probability. Synthese Library, vol 104. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1158-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1158-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1160-0
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