Abstract
David Hume distinguished four main elements in the relation of causation: constant conjunction, contiguity in space and time, temporal priority, and necessary connection. In this paper I will be mainly concerned with the first of these properties; and I will be mostly interested in some ontological aspects of event-causality. As Jaegwon Kim and others have shown, the ontological aspects of causality are very problematic and at least the subsumptivistic view of event-causation seems to be in deep ontological trouble (see e.g. Kim [1969] and [1973]). My main purpose in the paper is to try to present some arguments to defend the subsumptivistic or deductive-nomological approach.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Ackermann, R.: [1965], ‘Deductive Scientific Explanation’, Philosophy of Science, 32, pp. 155–67.
Ackermann, R. and Stenner, A.: [1966], ‘A Corrected Model of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science, 33, pp. 168–71.
Berofsky, B.: [1971], Determinism, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Davidson, D.: [1967], ‘Causal Relations’, The Journal of Philosophy, LXIV, pp. 691–703.
Davidson, D.: [1969], ‘The Individuation of Events’, in N. Rescher et al. (eds.) Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 216–234.
Goldman, A.: [1970], A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Kim, J.: [1969], ‘Events and Their Descriptions: Some Considerations’, in N. Rescher et al. op. cit., pp. 198–215.
Kim, J.: [1973], ‘Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event’, in The Journal of Philosophy, LXX, pp. 217–236.
Omer, I.: [1970], ‘On the D-N Model of Scientific Explanation’ Philosophy of Science, 37, pp. 417–433.
Quine, W.: [1966], The Ways of Paradox, Random House, New York.
Tuomela, R.: [1972], ‘Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws’ Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1, pp. 369–392.
Tuomela, R.: [1973], Theoretical Concepts, Library of Exact Philosophy, Springer-Verlag, Wien.
Tuomela, R.: [1974a], Human Action and Its Explanation, Reports from the Institute of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, No. 2. Forthcoming, in 1977, in revised and expanded form, as Human Actions and Their Explanation, Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston.
Tuomela, R.: [1974b], R.: [1974b], ‘Causes and Deductive Explanation’, forthcoming in the proceedings of the Fourth Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association held in Notre Dame, Illinois, in 1974.
Tuomela, R.: [1976], ‘Morgan on Deductive Explanation: A Rejoinder’, forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Logic.
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tuomela, R. (1976). Causality, Ontology, and Subsumptive Explanation. In: Przełęcki, M., Szaniawski, K., Wójcicki, R., Malinowski, G. (eds) Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences. Synthese Library, vol 103. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1135-8_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1135-8_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1137-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1135-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive