Abstract
Inductivism is the view, universally known and almost universally adopted, which recognizes the inductive method to be the basic method in the empirical sciences. Deductivism is upheld by Professor K. Popper, whose standpoint originated in his criticism of inductivism.1 His criticism is quite revolutionary, since it calls for the elimination of induction from the so-called inductive sciences and for its replacement by the deductive method as the only one which does not sin against the requirements of logical correctness and which makes it possible, in general, to avoid the difficulties encountered by induction. It is Pro fessor Popper’s conviction that the deductivist theory has succeeded in working out a detailed program of such a method. As indicated by the title, the purpose of this paper is to examine the issues emerging from the controversy between deductivism and inductivism. According to K. Popper, the critical analysis of the two rival theories, which was carried out in The Logic of Scientific Discovery,2 unequivocally resolved the problem in favour of deductivism. Namely, it was to demonstrate that deductivism enables to avoid those difficulties, which are present in the other theory, and that it does not lead at the same time to new difficulties. I should like to analyse critically this particular result. The matter is worth considering if only, because Popper sees the main, and may be the only, reason for the existence of deductivism in this putative advantage.
First published in Studia Filozoficzne 1 (22) (1961). Reprinted from a shortened version published in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, edited by E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski, Stanford University Press, 1962. The completion to original version translated by E. Ronowicz.
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References
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London 1959.
K. Popper, op. cit.
It would be well to mention that in the vocabulary of the deductionist the term ‘observable’ in contrariety to ‘observed’ is a non-psychological term.
A precise description, formulated only for general universal statements, (in short: for nomological statements, and in Popper’s terminology for ‘theories’) is as follows: “A theory is to be called empirical or falsifiable if it divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistcnt (…), we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory; secondly the class of basic statements which it does not contradict” (op. cit., p. 86).
Although, as was pointed out by Popper (op. cit. p. 91), also all tautological statements result from basic sentences — e.g. on the basis of the formula such as: q’(p’q), where this tautological statement should be substituted for q, and for p the conjunction of the basic sentences coming into play —they are not justified with the help of the basic statements, for they cannot be deduced from them without the vicious circle.
Cf. e.g. H. Mehlberg, ‘Positivisme et science’, Studia Philosophica III (1948), §11.
K. Popper, op. cit., pp. 34–36, 56 ff.
K. Popper, op. cit., pp. 30–32, 99 et passim. This is perhaps a good opportunity to mention that Prof. Popper is not always consistent in putting this into effect. For example, a certain breach is made by the assumption, important for deductivism, that the verification of a hypothesis has a justifying value only if it has been made in an honest and thorough way, with the desire to exhaust all the available tests that might be dangerous for the given hypothesis.
K. Popper, ‘Philosophy of Science’, a personal report, in: British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, London 1957, pp. 33, 42, 182-3, 265-6.
K. Popper, op. cit., p. 27.
Cf. e.g.: K. Twardowski, Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki (Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic), Lwów 1901; J. Hosiasson, ‘Definicje rozumowania in-dukcyjnego’ (‘Definitions of Inductive Reasoning’), Przeglqd Filozoficzny 31 (1928); K. Ajdukiewicz, Zarys logiki (Outline of Logic), Warszawa 1955; by the same author, Glówne zasady metodologii nauki i logiki formalnej (Basic Principles of the Methodology of Science and Formal Logic) (script), Warszawa 1928; A. La-lande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 5 th edition, 1947; D. Runes, The Dictionary of Philosophy, N. York 1942; St. Jevons, The Principles of Science, new edition, N. York 1958; Philosophical Writings of Peirce, selected a. edited by J. Buchler, N. York 1955; S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, 4th ed. 1945, etc., etc.
The direct consequence is the sentence: ‘(x) [A(x).C(x)→B(x)]’ or (x) [A(x). .D(x)→B(x)]’, etc.
Cf. e.g., the characteristics of the method of criticizing hypotheses presented by J. Giedymin in the article ‘Indukcjonizm i antyindukcjonizm’ (‘Inductivism and Anti-inductivism’), Studia Filozoficzne 2 (1959), p. 18, and accepted by Popper in his letter appended in extenso to the text of this article.
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© 1977 PWN - Polish Scientific Publishers - Warszawa
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Kotarbińska, J. (1977). The Controversy: Deductivism Versus Inductivism. In: Przełęcki, M., Wójcicki, R. (eds) Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland. Synthese Library, vol 87. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1126-6_15
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