The Problem of the Rationality of Non-Deductive Types of Inference (1958)

Abstract

This article treats a subject which belongs neither to formal logic nor metascience, but to the methodology of science. Since we shall deal with inferences, convictions, and degrees of certainty, the article will be full of psychological concepts. We shall also deal with people who think and act; the whole cognitive process will be considered in connection with the practical life of man and not as an idealized abstraction. The problem raised here is as follows: whether and when we can say that a man acts rationally, if he believes conclusions drawn from true premisses in a fallible way, i.e. on the basis of an inference which from true premisses may lead to false conclusions. So-called enumerative induction is one such fallible type of inference. Logicians and methodologists have devoted considerable attention to the question known as the problem of justification of induction. However, the nature of this problem i.e. what should be done in order to justify induction has not been clarified. The aim of the present article is to give a clearer sense to the problem of the justification of induction and, at the same time, to make an attempt — unfortunately one without a practical value — at solving this problem.

Revised translation by David Pearce. First published in Studia Filozoficzna (1958), No. 4 14–29.Jezyk i poznanie, II,282–295. Reprinted here by kind permission of PWN.