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Economics and Ontology

  • Peter Koslowski
Part of the Issues in Business Ethics book series (IBET, volume 17)

Abstract

Economic ethics and philosophy have three common spheres of research and intersect in three fields. Besides the fields of economic ethics or ethical economy, and cultural philosophy of the economy, which have been discussed above, there exists a third field, economic ontology, understood as the theory of the fundamental determinants of the sphere of being of the economy.1 We tum now to the analysis of the ontology of the economy and its relationship to economic ethics.

Keywords

Human Person Economic Reality Acting Person Partial Equilibrium Austrian School 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Koslowski
    • 1
  1. 1.Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie HannoverHannoverGermany

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