Abstract
Professor Lynne Rudder Baker suggests that when we begin our analysis of mental causation from a presupposed materialistic metaphysical picture then the phenomenon of mental causality, which seems to be trivial, turns out to be insoluble (Baker, 1993). I shall argue for her view as follows.
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References
Baker, L. R. 1993 ‘Metaphysics and Mental Causation’. Heil, J., Mele, A. (eds.)Mental Causation, 75–95. Oxford: Clarendon.
Davidson, D. 1980Actions and Events.Oxford: Clarendon.
Davidson, D. 1993 ‘Thinking Causes’. Heil, J., Mele, A. (eds.) Mental Causation, 3–17. Oxford: Clarendon.
O’Shaughnessy,B.1992 ‘The diversity and unity of action and perception’. T. Crane (ed.)The Contents of Experience, 216–266. Cambridge etc.: CUP.
Wittgenstein, L.Philosophical Investigations.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Kivistik, J. (2001). On the Raising of a Hand. In: Vihalemm, R. (eds) Estonian Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 219. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0672-9_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0672-9_22
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