The Path to Competition for Telecommunications in Germany



Will telecommunications in Germany remain imprisoned by its own history? Did the legislature open the prison door in vain when it lifted the telecommunications monopoly? Have the decades of imprisonment rendered it too weak to stand on its own two feet? This is how telecommunications in Germany is portrayed by many1, including its regulatory authority2. The legislature rightfully exercises more care. Instead of imposing the transition to competition from above; it restricts itself to a tailor-made correction of the specific competitive problems of the transition (I). This particularly applies to the heavily-disputed case surrounding the right of a new provider to unbundled access to the local loop belonging to Telekom (II).


Competitive Market Market Entry Competition Policy Telecommunication Service Natural Monopoly 
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  1. 1.
    See for example Thomas Lampert: Der Begriff der Marktbeherrschung als geeignetes Kriterium zur Bestimmung der Normadressaten für das sektorspezifische Kartellrecht nach dem TKG?, in: WuW 1998, 27–38 (36); Karl-Michael Fuhr/Bärbel Kerkhoff: Ent-bündelter Zugang — Vereinbarkeit mit der Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 14 GG?, in: MMR 1998,6–11 (7).Google Scholar
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    At any rate, its president Klaus-Dieter Scheurle writes: “The creation [sic!] of equal opportunities and functioning competition is the decisive lever also to achieve the other objectives [of the TKG]” (Klaus-Dieter Scheurle: Aufgaben der Regulierungsbehörde Telekommunikation und Post, appears in XXXI. FIW-Symposion. Multimedia: Kommunikation ohne Grenzen — grenzenloser Wettbewerb 7, Page 4 of the cover)ft.Google Scholar
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  4. 4.
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    Hartwig Bartling summarizes the competition models: Leitbilder der Wettbewerbspolitik. 1980.Google Scholar
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  7. 12.
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    Previously §§ 22 and 26 GWB.Google Scholar
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    Summarized by Immenga/ Mestmäcker-Immenga § 1 GWB2, R 182 et seq.Google Scholar
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    Previously § 26 II GWB.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Max-Planck-Project GroupUniversity of OsnabrückGermany

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