Abstract
In the first part of my paper I recapitulate some main points of Searle’s theory of institutional facts, as stated in Chapters 1-6 of his book The Construction of Social Reality.1 First, I describe the puzzle that motivates the inquiry and the three main goals of his theory. Then, I describe the two structures that (in my opinion) constitute the core of his theory: “X counts as Y” and power. Finally, I introduce a number of (in my opinion) auxiliary and accessory components of his theory. Apart from the organization of the material, the presentation here aims at a faithful, clear and succint reproduction of Searle’s original position, with just two or three rather small (and notified) innovations.
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Searle, John R., The Construction of Social Reality. London: Allen Lane, 1995 (quoted as CSR). Other Searle’s texts on this subject are “Précis of The Construction of Social Reality” and “Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), 427-428 and 449-458; “Replies to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality”, History of the Human Sciences 10 (1997), no. 4, 103-110; and Mind, Language, and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), quoted as MLS (especially Ch. 5 and 6).
Hacking, Ian. “Searle, Reality, and the Social.” History of the Human Sciences 10 (1997), no. 4, 83–92.
Unfortunately, Hacking does not seem to observe Searle’s distinction between social facts and institutional facts: in his text, unexplained transitions from “social facts” (pp. 86, 87 and 89) to “institutional facts” (p. 88) and back leave the impression that the two terms are to be used interchangeably (for Searle, institutional facts form a special subclass of social facts, the latter being defined simply as facts involving collective intentionality — see CSR 26 and 121-124).
Hacking, op. cit., p. 85.
One author that discusses Searle’s project as “epistemological” is Thomas Osborne; see p. 98 of his “The Limits of Ontology”, History of the Human Sciences 10 (1997), 97–102.
See e.g. CSR 2-6,13; “Précis” 428.
Stated more explicitly recently in MLS.
Hacking, op. cit., p. 87.
Hacking, op. cit., p. 89 (italics J.M.).
In fact, Searle refers to both forms of his theory as to descriptions of “logical structure”; see CSR 31 and 104, 109-113. He explains what he means on p. 90 of CSR: since institutional reality contains linguistic representations as its constitutive elements, and these have logical structure, one can speak of the logical structure of institutional reality.
[I]nstitutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules” (CSR 28), “it must always have the structure X counts as Y in C” (CSR 40).
The theory has been stated by Searle in a rudimentary form already in the 1960’s; see his Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969: sections 2.5 and 2.7, especially pp. 53–55.
Searle asserts (CSR 95, see also CSR 104) that not all status functions have to do with power. One reason for that he is explicit about (CSR 96) is his interpretation of honors as not conferring power (CSR 96-97, 101-102), but this interpretation is controversial (and Searle himself revises it later on — see CSR 109-110). Having been elected Miss Bielefeld in fact entitles the holder to hold the title for a certain period of time (to use it in the public etc.) and everybody else is required not to do the same, i.e. what we have here is rather a case of a curiously immaterial, honor-oriented power than that of no power at all. Searle does not mention other reasons for claiming only restricted validity of his second, content oriented analysis, and in the conclusion of the passage (CSR 111) he actually removes the restriction. Possibly we are invited to see his earlier assertions as expressing only a preliminary point of view that is being revised as the investigation proceeds.
Searle actually shows that it is possible to do with just one of the two, and to define being enabled to do A as not being required not to do A (or vice versa) within the restricted universe of conventional power — CSR 107-108.
In CSR 25 Searle contrasts his position with that of methodological individualism. He changed his opinion meanwhile and now claims (correctly I think) compatibility of methodological individualism (in Popper’s definition) with his position (”Précis” 427, MLS 119-120), perhaps influenced by Jennifer Hornsby’s criticism in her “Collectives and Intentionality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), 429–434 (see especially p. 430 and p. 449 of Searle’s “Responses”).
Searle is not explicit about this distinction in the book, but it makes good sense to draw it.
CSR 44-45; on constitutive rules see also CSR 27-29.
But, as we shall see (below section II.2.c), there are some border-line cases where this relationship is questionable.
CSR 47. On invisibility see also CSR 4-5, 14, 21-22,96, 98, 125-127.
I am not sure what exactly is Searle’s answer to the initial question “what makes an equipment fact epistemically objective?”. Perhaps it is simply X’s objective causal pertinence (cf. CSR 77). It may seem a wrong answer because it does not seem to have anything to do with the question of our considering X such and such piece of equipment (e.g. a bathtub), as the causal properties of X are its intrinsic features and they are there regardless of all our considering etc. However, it may be our setting the conditions of proper fimctioning that would make the difference: the feature of being a bathtub will be observer-relative, matching the functional conditions (that define the feature) will not. — But this may be a dangerous policy: how can “being a bathtub” be an observer-relative feature when its (presumably equivalent) translation into causal conditions (which then can be objectively matched by an X) is intrinsic? And how could objective matching decide the question about observer-relative feature if we didn’t have equivalent translation?
Of course, the formula will not contain the “We accept” clause in this case.
To name but a few McGinn, Colin. “Contract with Reality.” New Republic (22.5.1995): 37; Homsby, Jennifer. “Collectives and Intentionality.” Philosophy and Pheneomenological Research 57 (1997): 429; Hacking, Ian. op. cit., p. 83; and Midgley, Mary. “Skimpole Unmasked.” History of the Human Sciences 10 (1997): 93.
Hacking, loc. cit.
Admittedly, in this particular passage Searle speaks exclusively about the lowest level of institutional facts, about “the shift from a brute level to an institutional one”. But he says explicitly in the first sentence of the next paragraph: “The lesson from this example can now be extended to institutional facts in general.” 25 McGinn, loc. cit.
Except with regard to his treatment of some specific problems like functions (CSR 16-18), collective intentionality (CSR 24-26) and causation and the Background (CSR 128,138-141).
This problem is related to one mentioned above in connection with Hacking, namely whether Searle wants to establish necessary and sufficient conditions of possibility of epistemically objective judgements about institutional facts, or just sufficient. Only, one is formulated with regard to the ontology of civilization problem area, and the other to the (quasi) transcendental one.
See “Précis” and MLS 132–133.
The two camps also may attempt to seek support from the core structures, but it is not quite clear what their leanings really are.
On the one hand, the distinctions between institutional facts: self-identifying versus others (CSR 74), linguistic versus non-linguistic (CSR 99, 110, 124), codified versus non-codified (CSR 53, 87-89,116, 128), honorific versus others (CSR 96-97, 101-102, 109-110), procedural versus terminal (CSR 102, 105, 109), and ongoing versus others (CSR 106, 115). On the other, the distinction between creation and maintenance of institutional facts (CSR 109, 117-119, 124).
See Wettersten, John. “The Analytic Study of Social Ontology: Breakthrough or Cul-de-Sac?” The Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (1998): 132–151.
Searle adopts the same position also at CSR 108-109.
The canonic passage seems to be the sub-section “The Continued Existence of Institutional Facts” (CSR 117-119). The word “maintenance” does not occur there, but the hints from where it does (CSR 105, 113) seem to be pointing there unambiguously. Another clear statement is on p. 47: “As long as people continue to recognize the X as having the Y status function, the institutional fact is [...] maintained.”
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Moural, J. (2002). Searle’S Theory of Institutional Facts: A Program of Critical Revision. In: Grewendorf, G., Meggle, G. (eds) Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_18
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