Abstract
Intentionality is a key-notion in Searle’s philosophical thinking. It plays a dominant role not only in many of his articles on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, but it also figures as the title of one of his books. For reasons of space I cannot discuss all the issues which are dealt with there [Searle 1983]. These issues cover such diverse (though interrelated) topics as the Intentionality1 of mental states; Intentionality of perception and action; Intentional causation; Intentionality of language and communication in general plus Intentionality of indexical expressions, of natural kind terms, and of proper names in particular. Thus I will not touch upon the derived Intentionality of language, i.e. on the systematic meaning or function which the intentions of a person have for the purposes of linguistic and nonlinguistic communication, because these issues rather belong to another section of this symposium on “Speech acts and Intentionality”. Instead I want to focus on the basic distinction between genuine or “intrinsic” Intentionality on the one hand, and derived or “metaphorical” Intentionality on the other hand, and try to shed some light on the question:
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Lenzen, W. (2002). Intrinsic Intentionality. In: Grewendorf, G., Meggle, G. (eds) Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_12
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