Abstract
The medical promise of genetic therapy on gametes, zygotes, and early fetuses (which I will refer to hereafter as ’prenatal therapy’) lies in the plasticity of the entities on which it is performed. Genetic changes in one cell, or a few cells, may result in major phenotypic changes in the child that emerges, changes that would be impossible or impractical to introduce at a later stage. But the very plasticity that makes prenatal therapy medically attractive makes it morally problematic. Genetic changes made in a zygote or early fetus seem more likely to alter its identity, and the identity of the resulting person, than similar genetic changes made (if that is even possible) in a late fetus or child.
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Wasserman, D. (2002). Personal Identity and the Moral Appraisal of Prenatal Therapy. In: Parker, L.S., Ankeny, R.A. (eds) Mutating Concepts, Evolving Disciplines: Genetics, Medicine, and Society. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 75. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0269-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0269-1_12
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