The Critique of the Phenomenological Concept of the World According to Michel Henry

  • Michael Staudigl
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 79)


Starting from an analysis of Husserl’s concept of the world, I want to show that the structure of the world has been thematized in a restricted way only within classic phenomenology. This omission can be traced back to a twofold reason: On the one hand, the specific phenomenality of the world has been established as the matrix of phenomenological analysis. But this structure, the “pre-givenness” of the world, has also been designated, on the other hand, as the one and only kind of phenomenality, according to which our experience of the world is explicated. Against this background and by means of a radicalised reduction, Michel Henry recovers the fundamental distinction between two different modes of appearing, i.e. originary revelation and manifestation. By restoring this distinction he finally opens the opportunity to break open the self-imposed moderation of phenomenology in order to perform an analysis of “the world” which recognizes its impressional-practical depth as “cosmos.” As M. Henry states, “I am the life of the world.”1


Phenomenological Analysis Phenomenological Concept Pure Immanence Ontological Monism Radicalise Reduction 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Staudigl
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ViennaAustria

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