The Human Creative Condition Between Autopoiesis and Ontopoiesis in the thought of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

  • Daniela Verducci
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 79)


The appearance of the first two volumes of the book series Analecta Husserliana, in 1971 and 1972 respectively, did not evoke particular sensation in the philosophical academy: it seemed that they simply sought to fulfill the need of numerous afficionados of the Husserlian method of philosophy to find a stable place for communication and discussion, since the historical Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung had been out of print for forty years. In reality, the outlook of the founder and editor, Anna-Teresa Tyminiecka, was much wider and more radical. In fact, in her mind, the recent history of phenomenology demonstrated a series of exigencies and opportunities that could not be left unaddressed, without dissipating and ending the new philosophical vitality that had matured.


Emotional Intelligence Human Condition Conscious Experience Creative Imagination Creative Experience 
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  1. 1.
    Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “From the Editor,” in Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, vol. I (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1971), p. vi.Google Scholar
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    The system of thought of Tymieniecka, in its organic exposition, occupies for now three volumes of Analecta Husserliana Id., “Logos and Life: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason,” Book 1, Analecta Husserliana, XXIV (1988); Id., “Logos and Life: The Three Movements of the Soul,” Book 2, Analecta Husserliana, XXV (1988); Id., “Logos and Life: The Passions of Soul and the Elements in the Onto-Poiesis of Culture,” Book 3, Analecta Husserliana, XXVIII (1990). A new work of notable size has been completed and published in 2000.Google Scholar
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    Ibid, pp. 5–6. We permit ourselves to dissent from Tymieniecka’s interpretation of Scheler, which perhaps depends on an inexact reception of the Schelerian text Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Gesammelte Werke, 9, 1975) which also in Italy has been misunderstood. A particular source of misunderstanding is the diagram illustrating the man-environment relationship, graphically representing the human capacity of Weltoffenheit, absent in animals. In fact, while the animal-environment relationship is defined by a closed reciprocity: A ⊓ E, for the man-world relationship there is an open reciprocity: M ⊓ W ⊓ ⊓ ⊓. Weltoffenheit is not thus only “openness-to-the-world” as R. Padellaro and M. T. Pansera understand, in their translations (respectively: Fabbri, Milano, 1970 and Armando, Roma, 1997); nor is it enough to add the meaning of “openness-in-the-world” as G. Cusinato rightly does (in: Katharsis. La morte dell’ego e il divino come apertura al mondo nella prospettiva di Max Scheler; ESI, Salerno, 1999, note 5 of p. 23), pointing out the second movement of reciprocity, by which, in the Selbstgegebenheit, the world also opens to the person. It is still necessary to explain the meaning of the arrows that branch off from the world in succession, and thus, a third meaning of Weltoffenheit, should be introduced, beyond the relationship of reciprocity: that of further “openness-of-the-world,” this time on the part of man, who, exercising ideation, continually produces new “visions-of-the-world”.Google Scholar
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    Also R. Eucken exhorted his contemporaries to struggle for the goal of giving meaning of life, cfr.: R. Eucken, Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, Leipzig, 1899, but his appeal remained almost entirely ignored. Only Max Scheler, his student in Jena, declared that he drew from that work the idea for his 1899 essay, Arbeit und Ethik (Gesammelte Werke 1, “Frühe Schriften,” 1971, pp. 161–197; Ital. trans, by D. Verducci, Lavoro ed Etica. Saggio di Filosofia Pratica, Città Nuova Editrice, Roma 1997), from whence his reflection on work begins.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniela Verducci
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MacerataItaly

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