Phenomenology and Grammar

A Consideration of the Relation Between Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 8)


Edmund Husserl’s research in the problems concerning phenomenological reduction is a beautiful exemplification of philosophical strictness. In fact, we cannot begin the activity of philosophizing unless we go beyond the naiveté of the natural standpoint in accordance with which we believe unconditionally in the existence of the world, and live completely absorbed in the matters therein. We have to suspend this belief and, with a full determination, to think over everything again on our own responsibility. At the same time, without our internal tension and effort to maintain this determination, we cannot pursue our philosophical consideration with success. However, it is quite another matter whether we accept Husserl’s conviction that the field of experience and cognition opened by phenomenological reduction must be that of transcendental consciousness, and solve all the problems therein. The assumption that all the existence and significance must be reduced to the constitutive acts of consciousness may be, conversely, an encumbrance to the thorough pursuit of that philosophical task. I do not believe that we can solve all the problems of philosophy by one and the same method. We should rather think of the procedure of reduction as an open method unrestricted by the standpoint of transcendental subjectivism. I want to justify and develop this simple and perhaps “naive” belief of mine as far as possible. This is the motivation of my offering this thesis here.


Logical Investigation Phenomenological Reduction Linguistic Sign Elementary Proposition Semantical Reduction 
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© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1979

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