Abstract
My task is, I take it, to discuss some problems involved in specifying criteria of scientific progress, referring especially to the views expressed in the papers written by my friends from the LSE. I fear that profound criticisms are not to be expected from one invited here as a ‘sympathizer’ with the LSE position. But I will do my best.
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Musgrave, A. (1978). Evidential Support, Falsification, Heuristics, and Anarchism. In: Radnitzky, G., Andersson, G. (eds) Progress and Rationality in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 58. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_8
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