Abstract
I will confine this reply to arguments that hit, or at least are aimed at, the position defended in my position paper. This means that I will concentrate mainly on the papers of Feyerabend, Hübner, and Grünbaum. Grünbaum’s paper I regard as the most serious challenge in the present volume to the Popperian position. He criticises, among other things, an assumption, concerning the possibility of content-comparisons between rival theories, which is central to our position. I think that his criticism can be met. But in the meanwhile a more deadly objection to this assumption has been made by Miller, and the last part of my reply will be concerned with this crucial issue.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1978 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Watkins, J. (1978). Corroboration and the Problem of Content-Comparison. In: Radnitzky, G., Andersson, G. (eds) Progress and Rationality in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 58. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0922-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9866-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive