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Association

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Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 7)

Abstract

This study intends to determine the relationship between intentionality and association. Association is not simply a concept belonging to psychophysics; I will offer a personal idea about how it works. I will argue that the intentional conception of the mind propounded by Husserl does not supersede an associationist conception of the mind’s functioning.

Keywords

Ideal Identity Sensory Element Verbal Material Visual Mark Associational Recognition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible, Gallimard, Paris, 1964, pp. 271–227.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, Paris, 1954, pp. 358–359.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Emmanuel Levinas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, 2nd ed., Vrin, Paris, 1967, pp. 205–206.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Ibid.,pp. 198–201,207–208.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, transl. Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960,p. 41–43.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961, pp. 9–10, 37–38.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cf. Levinas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, pp. 198–201,207–208.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini, pp. 55–56,184. 9Ibid., pp. 179–184.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Pennsylvania State UniversityUSA

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