Contextual Phenomenology and the Problem of Creativity

Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 7)


The diversity of metaphysical systems as well as the variety of concomitant methodologies which have been proposed throughout the history of philosophical reflection often inspire the judgment that philosophy is nothing but idle speculation, if not pure imaginative construction. Husserl’s effort to establish philosophy on a rigorously scientific basis may be seen as a radical attempt to preclude the validity of such an assessment. Beginning from the imperative, “zu den Sachen selbst,” Husserl wanted to ground the entire sphere of human cognition on an absolutely apodictic foundation. By a strict adherence to this self-imposed requirement, Husserl’s inquiry developed from an original focus upon static eidetic structures toward a concern with the dynamic development of genetic constitution.


Creative Process World Order Artistic Creativity Creative Product Real Individual 
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  1. 1.
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1978

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