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Acts, Objects, and the Relations between Them

  • Chapter
The Development of Husserl’s Thought

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 76))

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Abstract

If it is true that each philosophy has only one “original intuition,” then Husserl’s is the discovery of the mystery of consciousness, the “wonder of all wonders.”1 Husserl’s student Fink, who has characterized his teacher as a “genius of reflection and analysis,” speaks of a “gigantic vivisection of consciousness” which Husserl carried out, with ever more subtle analyses and with an eye to even the smallest nuances.2 In LU we see that Husserl for the first time tries to describe the inexhaustible riches of consciousness. Later, after 1908, he also discovered the ontological absoluteness of this mystery that bears the entire world.

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  270. See also A. de Waelhens Une Philosophie de l’ambiguité,89ff who claims that in this period, Husserl maintained the idea of an “interior consciousness,” closed and pure,which pictures for itself something outside, which is inaccessible in itself.” The question whether there is a reality corresponding to this representation would then be insoluble.

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  1. Theodore De Boer
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© 1978 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

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De Boer, T. (1978). Acts, Objects, and the Relations between Them. In: The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Phaenomenologica, vol 76. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9691-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9691-5_7

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