Abstract
The role in ethics of game theory proper (as opposed to decision theory) is discussed via an elucidation of a new theory of justice. The new theory integrates into a coherent whole two fundamental distributive norms: To Each According to his Needs; and to Each According to his Contribution. The theory incorporates a new account of ethics in terms of impartial decision — an account which dispenses with the need for a Veil of Ignorance construct. Also, the new theory does not require the use of interpersonal comparisons of utility at an operational level, even though such comparisons arise at a conceptual level. The reason for this lies in its relationship to game theoretical structures which do not entail interpersonal comparisons. Finally, the theory makes possible a new interpretation of two cooperative game solutions: The Nash solution, and the Generalized Shapley Value.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Arrow, Kenneth J.: 1978, ‘Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice’, Philosophia VII, No. 2.
Aumann, Robert J.: 1975, ‘Values of markets with a continuum of traders’, Econometria 43.
Aumann, Robert J. and Mordecai Kurz: 1977, ‘Power and taxes in a multi-commodity market’, Israel Journal of Mathematics 27.
Brock, Horace W.: 1977, ‘Unbiased representative decision-making: A study of invariance relationships in n-person valutaion theory’, Proceedings J.A.C.C.
Brock, Horace W.: 1978, ‘A new theory of justice based on the mathematical theory of games’, appearing in: Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. Ordeshook (New York University Press, New York).
Brock, Horace W.: 1978a, ‘The role of symmetry groups in the representation and interpretation of alternative theories of fair distribution’, Proceedings of the Naval Postgraduate School Conference in Mathematics Linkages.
Brock, Horace W.: 1978b, ‘The Shapley Value as a tool for the conceptual unification of economics, politics, and ethics’, Proceedings of the American Political Science Meetings.
Brock, Horace W.: 1978c, ‘A critical discussion of the work of John C. Harsanyi’, Theory and Decision 9.
Brock, Horace W.: 1979, ‘The problem of “utility weights” in group preference aggregation’, Operations Research (forthcoming).
Harsanyi, John C.: 1953, ‘Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk- taking’, Journal of Political Economy 61.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1955, ‘Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility’, Journal of Political Economy 63.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1958, ‘Ethics in terms of hypothetical imperatives’, Mind 67, pp. 305–316.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1961, ‘On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 5.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1963, ‘A simplified bargaining model for the n-person cooperative game’, International Economic Review 4.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1975, The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person non-cooperative games’, International Journal of Game Theory 4.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1975a, ‘Can the maximin principle serve as the basis for morality: A critique of John Rawls’ theory’, American Political Science Review 69.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1977a, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Harsanyi, John C.: 1977b, ‘Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics’, Working Paper CP-404, Center for Research in Management Science, University of California, Berkeley.
Harsanyi, John C.: 1978, ‘A solution theory for non-cooperative games and its Implications for cooperative games’, appearing in: Game Theory and Political Science, ed. by P. Ordeshook (New York University Press, New York).
Kaneko, Mamoru and K. Nakamura: 1977, ‘The Nash social welfare function’, forthcoming in: Econometrica.
Nozick, Robert: 1974, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York).
Rawls, John: 1971, A Theory of Justice (The Bellknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge).
Sen, Amartya: 1977, ‘On weights and measures: Informational constraints in social welfare analysis’, Econometrica 45, No. 7.
Strasnick, Steven: 1975, Preference Priority and the Maximization of Social Welfare, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
Shapley, Lloyd S.: 1969, ‘Utility comparisons and the theory of games’, appearing in: La Decision: Aggregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, ed. by G. Th. Guilbaud (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris).
Taylor, Charles: 1976, ‘Normative criteria of distributive justice’, Unpublished conference paper communicated to the author through the courtesy of Professor Daniel Bell of Harvard University.
Wolff, Robert P.: 1977, Understanding Rawls (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Brock, H.W. (1979). A Game Theoretic Account of Social Justice. In: Brock, H.W. (eds) Game Theory, Social Choice and Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9532-1_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9532-1_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-9534-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9532-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive