Much of what a person knows at any time is based on evidence the person has, or perhaps has had. More generally, most of a person’s knowledge at any time is based on reasons that the person has or has had. But what is it for knowledge to be based on evidence or reasons? A complete answer to this question requires a full theory of inferential knowledge, something I will not try to provide here. Instead, I will examine three notions of basing, each of which, under some interpretation, seems necessary for knowing on the basis of evidence or reasons.
KeywordsBase Relation Justify Belief Correct Place Brain Event Inferential Knowledge
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- M. Swain, ‘Epistemic Defeasibility,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 11, (1974)Google Scholar
- G. Pappas & M. Swain, eds., Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978 )Google Scholar
- K. Lehrer, ‘Knowledge, Truth and Evidence,’ in M. Roth & L. Galis, eds., Knowing, ( New York: Random House ), 1970, p. 56Google Scholar
- Swain, ‘Reasons, Causes and Knowledge,’ op. cit., pp. 229–230. Compare G. Harman, Thought, (Princeton: Princeton University Press ), 1973, Chapter 2Google Scholar
- Lehrer, ‘Knowledge, Truth and Evidence’ in Roth & Galis, op. cit., p. 56. Compare Lehrer, Knowledge, ( London: Oxford University Press ) 1974, pp. 156–157Google Scholar
- Elsewhere, Lehrer notes this point; see Knowledge, pp. 156–157Google Scholar
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