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Justification and the Basis of Belief

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Justification and Knowledge

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 17))

Abstract

Whether a person, S, has knowledge that h depends upon the reasons for which S believes that h. The reasons for which a person believes something constitute that upon which the person’s belief is based.1 It often happens that a person’s belief that h is based upon a set of reasons R when believing that h on the basis of R is not justified for that person. This can happen even though the person has other reasons such that if the belief had been based upon those reasons, then the belief would have been justified. In such a case, S cannot be said to have knowledge. Consider, for example, Raquel and Laura, both of whom are tellers in a large bank, and both of whom are incredibly beautiful and vivacious. It is the stated policy of the bank that employees who are efficient and responsible can expect to be promoted after a sufficient time, and this policy has been carefully explained to Raquel and Laura. However, Raquel does not believe that decisions to promote are actually a function of efficiency and responsibility. Rather, she believes, quite irrationally, that the president of the bank is infatuated with her beauty and that she will be promoted because of this infatuation. Laura, on the other hand, believes that she, too, will be promoted, but her belief is based upon her belief that she is efficient and responsible and upon her belief that it is the policy of the bank to promote people such as herself. Assuming that both tellers will be promoted, we may say, of Laura, that she knows she will be promoted, but we certainly may not say this of Raquel. The explanation of this difference lies in the fact that Laura’s belief is based upon justifying reasons, while Raquel’s belief is not so based.

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References

  • Michael D. Roth and Leon Galis (eds.), Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, (Random House, 1970 )

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  • In 1963, Edmund L. Gettier argued that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge in his paper ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 23 (1963), 121–123

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  • George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification, (Cornell University Press, 1978 )

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  • John L. Pollock, The “Possible Worlds” Analysis of Counterfactuals; Philosophical Studies, 29 (1976), 469–476

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  • See Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 124–125

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  • M. Swain (ed.) Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief (Reidel, 1970 ). In Knowledge (op. cit.), pp. 192–198

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© 1979 D. Riedel Publishing Company

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Swain, M. (1979). Justification and the Basis of Belief. In: Pappas, G.S. (eds) Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1024-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9493-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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