Abstract
The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts.
Keywords
- True Belief
- Justify Belief
- Wishful Thinking
- Justificational Status
- Reliable Process
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References
‘A Causal Theory of Knowing,’ The Journal of Philosophy 64, 12 (June 22, 1967): 357–372
Innate Knowledge,’ in S. P. Stich, ed., Innate Ideas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ The Journal of Philosophy 73, 20 (November 18, 1976), 771–791.
This assumption violates the thesis that Davidson calls ‘The Anomalism of the Mental’. Cf. ‘Mental Events,’ in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, , Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).
Keith Lehrer’s example of the gypsy lawyer is intended to show the inappropriateness of a causal requirement. (See Knowledge, Oxford: University Press, 1974, pp. 124–125.)
Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, eds., Values and Morals, Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt ( Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978 ).
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© 1979 D. Riedel Publishing Company
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Goldman, A.I. (1979). What is Justified Belief?. In: Pappas, G.S. (eds) Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1024-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9493-5
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