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What is Justified Belief?

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Justification and Knowledge

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 17))

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts.

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References

  • ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing,’ The Journal of Philosophy 64, 12 (June 22, 1967): 357–372

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  • Innate Knowledge,’ in S. P. Stich, ed., Innate Ideas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)

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  • Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ The Journal of Philosophy 73, 20 (November 18, 1976), 771–791.

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  • This assumption violates the thesis that Davidson calls ‘The Anomalism of the Mental’. Cf. ‘Mental Events,’ in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, , Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).

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  • Keith Lehrer’s example of the gypsy lawyer is intended to show the inappropriateness of a causal requirement. (See Knowledge, Oxford: University Press, 1974, pp. 124–125.)

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  • Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, eds., Values and Morals, Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt ( Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978 ).

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© 1979 D. Riedel Publishing Company

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Goldman, A.I. (1979). What is Justified Belief?. In: Pappas, G.S. (eds) Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1024-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9493-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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