Disagreement and Rationality

Abstract

If two people in the same situation must make a decision, e.g., the choice of a candidate, a judicial judgment, etc., and decide differently, can we assume that each is capable of acting reasonably or must we assume that this is impossible and that one of them must act unreasonably because of imperfect knowledge of the facts or the compulsion to act from such irrational motives as passion, interest or capriciousness? Judicial decisions seem to imply this conclusion. J. Roland Pennock admits this when he writes: “Where a Court consists of more than one judge, presumably each of the judges, if acting with complete rationality, would arrive at the same decision in a given case.”¹ Although this conclusion seems to conform to common sense it is refuted by the well-known fact that the United States Supreme Court rarely reaches unanimous decisions, yet the Court commands great respect and its judges are known for their competency. The majority of the Court’s decisions which have been significant in American judicial history were by a majority of 6 to 3 or even 5 to 4. Should the conclusion be drawn that in each case the majority or minority decided in an unreasonable manner? Is there cause to doubt the intellectual or moral integrity of the Court, because some judges are at times in the majority and at others in the minority?

This article appeared in Archivio di Filosofia, 1966, pp. 87–93 and Droit, Morale et Philosophie (Paris, 1968), pp. 103–109.