Abstract
Our aim is to investigate certain aspects of scepticism concerning dreaming (hereafter termed dream scepticism). Central to this enterprise is the dream hypothesis, viz. the hypothesis that one is asleep and dreaming rather than awake. Dream scepticism involves the claim that with respect to any given person, at any given time, it is possible that the dream hypothesis is true. This claim is typically aligned with what may be termed the indistinguishability thesis, the claim that dreams and waking experience are intrinsically or qualitatively indistinguishable.
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Notes
Ayer, ‘Professor Malcom on Dreams’, The Journal of Philosophy, LVII 1960. See pp. 533–534
Donald Kalish, review of Normal Malcolm, Dreaming, The Journal of Philosophy LVIII 1961, p. 440
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Reed, T.M. (1979). Dreams, Scepticism, and Waking Life. In: Gustafson, D.F., Tapscott, B.L. (eds) Body, Mind, and Method. Synthese Library, vol 138. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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