Violence and the Socratic Theory of Legal Fidelity

Abstract

We are inclined to think of Socrates as a rebel against the society of his day. We also think of him as a man whose intellectual rebellion took a negative form — i.e., instead of propounding philosophical theories of his own, he revealed his wisdom in destroying through rational criticism the theoretical pretensions of his fellow citizens. Given these expectations, the dialogue Crito contains substantial surprises. For, though containing negative criticisms of Crito’s arguments, it is in the main an elaborate theoretical defense of obedience to the political powers that be. A part of this theoretical defense consists of a statement of a political theory, the social contract theory, which — at least until the time of Hegel and Marx — was the most influential theory in political thinking about such matters as obedience to law and political violence. For it is primarily a theory of legal fidelity — i.e., a theory which attempts to establish a moral obligation to obey the law, a moral obligation to honor one’s legal obligations. This theory has strongly affected philosophical thinking about violence because, according to most social contract theory, the greatest criticism to be made against violence is that it is illegal. Indeed, some of these theorists (e.g., Hobbes and Kant) are inclined to define violence as the illegal use of force or coercion. This assimilation of the problem of violence to the problem of disobedience, and the related tendency to regard law as the central concept of politics, are both present in the Crito.¹

In the following essay, I have for the most part death with Apology and Crito (relying on the translations by Benjamin Jowett and F. J. Church) as though they are philosophical works in English. I do not think this is totally unjustified because (a) the issues raised in the translations are of intrinsic philosophical interest and (b) it is primarily in translation that these works have had an impact in the recent history of ideas. Where some issue of translation did seem important, I was able to obtain assistance, for which I am very grateful, from my colleague Ronald Milo. I also found it useful to consult W. D. Adkins’ Merit and Responsibility, A Study in Greek Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960).