Abstract
There has indeed been much recent ado concerning possible worlds and substitutional quantification, to which Ruth Marcus calls attention in her highly provocative Presidential Address ‘Dispensing with Possibilia.’1 Moreover the ado has proliferated to such an extent as to be now almost beyond recall. Even so, Mrs. Marcus has found some interesting things to say about the subjects that merit further discussion. Her key point is that substitutional quantification suitably used enables her to dispense with possibilia, to which she confesses she has “always had an aversion.” Let us reflect upon how she purports to achieve this and call attention to what seem to be the inadequacies of her method. These might in fact be thought so considerable as to prevent her from reaching her goal.
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Notes
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association XLIX (1975–76): 39–48.
In this connection see P. Suppes, Probabilistic Metaphysics (Filosofiska Studier, nr. 22; Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala: 1974).
For some allied remarks, see Charles Parsons, ‘A Plea for Substitutional Quantification,’ The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 231–237.
Even the late Richard Montague is known to have made a similar point on at least one occasion.
See, for example, Events, Reference, and Logical Form.
‘Essential Attribution,’ The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 187–202, p. 199.
Recall Chapter VII above.
See especially Belief, Existence, and Meaning, pp. 218 ff.
See inter alia P. Suppes, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, Acta Philosophica Fennica, fasc. XXIV (North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam: 1970), pp. 96 ff. See also Chapter XV below.
Cf. Belief, Existence, and Meaning, pp. 263 ff., and Events, Reference, and Logical Form, pp. 15 ff.
The definiendum here is not to be confused with ‘e Undersp a’, the one being a virtual-relation expression, the other a sentential form.
Recall W.V. Quine, Word and Object, the opening chapters.
For discussion of these notions, see Semantics and Linguistic Structure, and recall Chapter VIII above.
Such as Wesley Salmon. See his ‘Events and Time,’ in Fact and Existence.
See his A Theory of Possibility (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 1975).
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Martin, R.M. (1979). On Possibilia and Essentiality: Ruth Marcus. In: Pragmatics, Truth, and Language. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 38. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_14
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