Abstract
Non-cognitivism in ethics is strictly entailed by Reichenbach’s epistemology. Having settled for a functional conception of knowledge, with prediction as the one and only function or purpose of knowledge, Reichenbach was committed to ethical non-cognitivism, i.e. to the view that there is no normative or prescriptive knowledge, that there are no moral truths, that moral judgements are neither true nor false.
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Bibliography
Reichenbach, H.: 1938, Experience and Prediction, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Reichenbach, H.: 1947, ‘Philosophy: Speculation or Science’, Nation 164, 20–22.
Reichenbach, H.: 1951, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles.
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© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Schuster, C. (1977). Appreciation and Criticism of Reichenbach’s Meta-Ethics: Achilles’ Heel of the System?. In: Salmon, W.C. (eds) Hans Reichenbach: Logical Empiricist. Synthese Library, vol 132. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9404-1_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9404-1_25
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