Abstract
“It makes no sense to ask for justification, or to question the legitimacy, of linguistic forms,” V. Kraft writes in his book The Vienna Circle (p. 60). “One should instead pay homage, in the logical analysis of language, to a principle of tolerance.” And in Note 65 of his book, the historian of the Circle continues: “This was emphasized for the first time by K. Menger in the controversy about the foundations of mathematics (‘Der Intuitionismus’, 1930)” — herein Chapter 2 — “and thereafter K. Popper endorsed this point of view as a regular tenet of the logic of science (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1935).”
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
From K. Popper’s later writings (especially “Replies to my Critics” in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 1974, p. 968) it appears that Popper objected to Carnap’s dogmatism before 1932 with arguments some of which were identical with the criticism (then unknown to Popper) that I expressed in the Circle ever since 1927.
The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (Library of Living Philosophers, 1963).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Menger, K. (1979). Logical Tolerance in the Vienna Circle. In: Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics. Vienna Circle Collection, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9347-1_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9347-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0321-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9347-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive