Abstract
Since Kant the question of whether existence is a predicate has been debated. The question cannot be settled on its own grounds, nor need it be. Existence is not a predicate if there is nothing to distinguished from it; but if it is only a part of being, so that there is a domain for what could exist but does not as well as for what does, (what had and what will) exist, then existence is a predicate.
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Notes
B. Russel, The Principles of Mathematics ( London 1937, Allen and Unwin), chapter III.
Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge, Mass. 1951, Harvard University Press).
W.S. Hatcher, Foundations of Mathematics (Philadelphia 1968 Suanders), p. 79.
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© 1979 Martinus Nijhoff, Publishers bv, The Hague
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Feibleman, J.K. (1979). Toward a Concrete Logic: Discreta. In: Assumptions of Grand Logics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9278-8_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9278-8_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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