Abstract
It is obvious that there is a fundamental relationship between perception and knowledge. This is not to say that the two are identical. At any given time, we each know many things that we do not perceive. I know at this moment that there is ice at the North Pole, but I am not perceiving this to be the case. Further, at any given time we each know many things that we are not even thinking about. At this moment I know certain facts of history and geography, for example, which are in no sense present to my mind; and I shall continue to know these facts even while sound asleep. For these and other reasons, perception cannot be simply identified with knowledge.
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Bibliography
Peter Unger, ‘An Analysis of Factual Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), pp. 157–170.
H. P. Grice, ‘The Casual Theory of Perception’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35 (1961), pp. 121–168
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Dicker, G. (1980). A Philosophical Problem Concerning Perception and Knowledge. In: Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9048-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9048-7_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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