Logic and the Theory of Scientific Change

Abstract

The discussion of J. Sneed’s and W. Stegmüller’s logical reconstruction of Kuhn’s conception of sciences change leads inevitably to the formulation of more general questions such as: what form, from the modern point of view, should be characteristic of the theory of change of scientific theories? What role belongs to logic, logical formalization of the content (intuitive) sentences of this theory during construction of such a theory? Certainly, these questions are not new. They essentially touch upon the central problems of the philosophy of science, and each influential methodological conception provided its own answer. And the rational reconstruction of Kuhn’s views developed by Sneed and Stegmüller and, in particular, the discussion of these issues between Kuhn, Sneed and Stegmüller that took place in 1975 at the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science shed new light on these topics which are fundamental for the philosophy and history of science. Thus it is appropriate to consider this continuing discussion.