Abstract
This paper is concerned with the problems described in the research project “Foundations of Science and Ethics” as follows:
The most general aim guiding the scientific enterprise is to obtain non-trivial truth and theoretical understanding. We shall outline in a preliminary way some conjectures concerning the normative features of scientific inquiry. Some norms are general in nature and estend through the various sciences as global restrictions. These include the already mentioned concern to seek truth and increase theoretical understanding. Interest in simplicity, consistency, coherence, and comprehensiveness are other general and perhaps invariant goals of contemporary science. One fundamental precept of science is to base conclusions on all empirical information that is available in the scientific community.
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References
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The problem that statements are true or false but norms may have other values b approached differently. Some transfer the usual truth-values to normative sentences (cf. Kutschera, Eirführung in die Logik der Normen, Werte und Entscheidungen Freiburg, 1973, p. 12 ff.), others say that the content of a normative sentence can be true or false Another way - proposed by the author - is to introduce supervalues which are specified as true and false when applied to descriptive sentences, as valid and invalid when applied to normative sentences and left unspecified when applied to mixed sentences (cf. P. Weingartner. ‘Über die Anwendung von Wahrheitswerten und Quantoren auf Normen’, in Strukturierungen und Entscheidungun im Rechtsdenken ed. I. Tammelo, Springer-Vienna 1978, p. 193–209). The problem need not concern us here. The important point is to realize that there are mixed propositions in the sense characierizcd above and that they play an important role in a normative explanation.
Cf. P. Suppes, ‘Can there be a normative Philosophy of Education?’, in Philosophy of Education 1968: Proceedings of the 24th Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society - Santa Monica, Stanford 1968, p. 1–21.
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Weingartner, P. (1980). Normative Characteristics of Scientific Activity. In: Hilpinen, R. (eds) Rationality in Science. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9032-6_15
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