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Probabilistic Empiricism and Rationality

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Rationality in Science

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 21))

Abstract

I shall not define with any precision what I mean by probabilistic empiricism, although it should be clear from the surface meaning that I do want to use probability concepts to deal with metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical matters. I intend deliberately to replace the concept of logical empiricism by that of probabilistic empiricism, and I shall argue that it is probabilistic concepts rather than logical concepts that provide a rich enough framework to justify both our ordinary ways of thinking about the world and our scientific methods of investigation.

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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Suppes, P. (1980). Probabilistic Empiricism and Rationality. In: Hilpinen, R. (eds) Rationality in Science. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9032-6_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9032-6_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-9034-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9032-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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