A Concern for Hardening of the Categories

Abstract

By keying philosophy to the designs of law and public policy the editors of this volume align it squarely with the interests of many legislators, judges, district attorneys, police, lawyers, psychiatrists, and workers in social service agencies. The most important and urgent issues of mental illness that concern these varied groups all have to do with conceptual, moral and ethical questions peculiarly within the special competence of philosophers. Studies of these linkages by philosophers, and other scholars dealing with essentially philosophical concerns, therefore, could be informative and perhaps even influential. Yet if ever these hopeful, exciting prospects are to be realized, much more will have to be said about matters of perspective and proportion, of context and structure. The virtual silence of the contributors to this volume on these scores indicates a general problem: the legal and public policy aspects and ramifications of mental illness have never been fully surveyed, mapped and catalogued. Along the artificial lines of categories within various disciplines, to be sure, tiny plots and subdivisions have been staked out. But from these alone one cannot determine if the results are gerrymandered or simply crazy-quilted. With so little appreciation of the general issues of mental illness, it is exceedingly difficult to appraise the accuracy and relative significance of studies on particular issues. Questions about the relationships among parts, and of parts to whole, desperately need systematic, sustained attention.

I borrow the term from F.H. Underhill, see Toynbee ([6], p. 1).