Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (II): On Sufficient Conditions for Conditional Probabilities
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In the last chapter, we found reason to agree with premise III.2, that no nonbasic statements are probable relative to basic-reports, when ‘p is probable relative to q’ is interpreted as a conditional statement with a factual antecedent, q, and a consequent stating that p is probable, highly credible, or reasonable. Our procedure was to begin with Heidelberger’s counterexample to Chisholm’s epistemic principle, B, and Chisholm’s attempt to avoid it, and then to show that Chisholm’s amendments and others like it are also mistaken.
KeywordsInductive Logic Mental Phenomenon Empirical Statement Skeptical Argument Epistemic Principle
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