Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (II): On Sufficient Conditions for Conditional Probabilities

  • James W. Cornman
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy book series (PSSP, volume 18)


In the last chapter, we found reason to agree with premise III.2, that no nonbasic statements are probable relative to basic-reports, when ‘p is probable relative to q’ is interpreted as a conditional statement with a factual antecedent, q, and a consequent stating that p is probable, highly credible, or reasonable. Our procedure was to begin with Heidelberger’s counterexample to Chisholm’s epistemic principle, B, and Chisholm’s attempt to avoid it, and then to show that Chisholm’s amendments and others like it are also mistaken.


Inductive Logic Mental Phenomenon Empirical Statement Skeptical Argument Epistemic Principle 
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  1. 1.
    See H. Heidelberger, ‘Chisholm’s Epistemic Principles’, Noûs 3 (1969), 75–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977, p. 66Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    R. Chisholm, ‘On the Nature of Empirical Evidence’, in R. Chisholm and R. Swartz (eds.), Empirical Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 241Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    R. Carnap, ‘Inductive Logic and Rational Decision’, in R. Carnap and R. Jeffrey (eds.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Barkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 25Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See R. Firth, ‘Ultimate Evidence’, The Journal of Philosophy 53 (1956); reprinted in R. Swartz (ed.), Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 486–496.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • James W. Cornman

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