The Explanatory Foundational Theory and Skepticism

  • James W. Cornman
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy book series (PSSP, volume 18)


We are ready to begin our attempt to discover whether correct use of the explanatory foundation theory yields something that contradicts skeptical thesis M1S3, that is, yields that at some time, t, it is acceptable for someone that there are physical objects he does not perceive at t, that nonsubjective events have occurred before t and will occur after t, and that other beings have mental phenomena. The way to proceed, of course, is to use the explanatory foundational principle F3.22 or, as I shall do, the simpler principle, F3.221, which it entails, and to search for those instantiations of clauses in the principle which yield what is desired.


Physical Object Perceptual Experience Visual Experience Great Pain Mental Phenomenon 
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  1. 1.
    P. Ziff, ‘The Simplicity of Other Minds’, Journal of Philosophy 62 (1965), 578CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    W. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960, p. 264Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956, pp. 214–222Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • James W. Cornman

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