An Argument for the Explanatory Foundational Theory and Against Skepticism

  • James W. Cornman
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy book series (PSSP, volume 18)


In the introduction, I hinted at a four-step master argument that would have the conclusion that it is unreasonable now for human beings to believe any of the three versions of moderate skepticism about physical objects, the past, the future, and other minds. As we shall see as I develop and explain the argument here, it has the beneficial side effect of also refuting skepticism about induction for us now.


Physical Object Human Decision Moral Decision Inductive Rule Empirical Statement 
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  1. 1.
    H. Feigl, ‘Validation and Vindication: An Analysis of the Nature and the Limits of Ethical Arguments’, in W. Sellars and J. Hospers (eds.), Readings in Ethical Theory, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, p. 674.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Cf. W. Salmon, ‘The Justification of Inductive Rules of Inference’, in I. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968, pp. 34- 35.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    W. Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives, Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1967, p. 410.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951, p. 245.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, sections 39, 42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

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  • James W. Cornman

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