A Semantic Definition of Proposition in Terms of Truth and Falsity

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 98)


In De Interpretatione Aristotle states a necessary condition for the application of the word ‘proposition’. He writes: “We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them. A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity”.1


Natural Language Ontological Status Quotation Mark Truth Predicate Correspondence Theory 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyState University of LiègeBelgium

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