Abstract
Let us briefly recall what one understands by the term ‘axiomatic definition’. The axioms of a discipline contain primitive terms. They allow any interpretation compatible with the truth of the axioms in which they occur. By the same token they exclude other interpretations. One may thus, with Tarski, assimilate axioms to propositional functions and primitive terms to variables. Axioms effect a sorting-out among the objects that belong to the domain constituting the value-range of these variables; they select the classes of those objects of which they are true. It is this power of selection, of delimitation, that one associates with definition.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
A. Tarski, Introduction to Logic, Oxford University Press, 1941;6th edn. 1954, p. 119.
A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 402–403.
W. V. O. Quine, ‘Ontological Remarks on the Propositional Calculus’ (1934) in The Ways of Paradox, Random House, New York, 1966, p. 61.
Quine, Ibid., p. 62.
W. V. O. Quine, ‘Logic and the Reification of Universals’, From A Logical Point of View, 1953; Harper Torchbooks, New York, 2nd edn., 1961, p. 109.
Quine,Ibid., p. 111.
G. G. Granger, Wittgenstein, Seghers, Paris, 1969, p. 40.
See G. E. Moore, ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures’ (1954), Philosophical Papers, Allen and Unwin, London, 1959, p. 296.
See I. Copi, Symbolic Logic, Colliers, Macmillan, London, 3d edn. 1967, p. 138.
R. Wells, ‘Meaning and Use’, Word X, (1954) 244.
P. F. Strawson, ‘Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths’, Philosophical Quarterly 7, (1957) 23.
P. F. Strawson, ‘Paradoxes, Posits, Propositions’, Philosophical Review LLXXVI, (1967) 214–219.
Strawson, ‘Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths’, op. cit., 19.
Strawson, Ibid., 20.
W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Wiley, New York, 1960, p. 65n.
P. F. Strawson, ‘Paradoxes, Posits, Propositions’, 216–217.
W. V. O. Quine, ‘Replies’, Synthese 19 (1968), 296; repr. in Words and Objections, D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.), Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969.
G. Ryle, ‘If, So, and Because’ in M. Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Cornell, Ithaca, 1950, p. 325.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gochet, P. (1980). The Syntactic Approach. In: Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. Synthese Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8951-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8949-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive