The Criterion of Ontological Commitment

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 98)


In ‘Ontological Commitment’ (1958), A. Church maintains that a precise formulation of a criterion of ontological commitment is a prior condition of any fruitful and rigorous discussion of the problem of universals: “…no discussion of an ontological question, in particular of the issue between nominalism and realism, can be regarded as intelligible unless it obeys a definite criterion of ontological commitment”.1


Ontological Commitment Propositional Variable Existential Quantifier Free Logic Ontological Assumption 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyState University of LiègeBelgium

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