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The Criterion of Ontological Commitment

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Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 98))

Abstract

In ‘Ontological Commitment’ (1958), A. Church maintains that a precise formulation of a criterion of ontological commitment is a prior condition of any fruitful and rigorous discussion of the problem of universals: “…no discussion of an ontological question, in particular of the issue between nominalism and realism, can be regarded as intelligible unless it obeys a definite criterion of ontological commitment”.1

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References

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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Gochet, P. (1980). The Criterion of Ontological Commitment. In: Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. Synthese Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8951-1

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