Abstract
Sellars distinguishes the reasoning appropriate to developing hypotheses and theories, i.e., induction, from that appropriate to testing and justifying its results, deduction. Induction is a legitimate mode of inference; it must be if scientific inquiry is to have any respectability. Sellars not only argues that induction is legitimate, but that empirical science in general is essentially inductive. ([47], p. 355; [40], p. 304) Empirical science proceeds within an inductive framework: a framework which accepts inductive inference as rational.
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© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Pitt, J.C. (1981). Rules of Inference, Induction, and Ampliative Frameworks. In: Pictures, Images, and Conceptual Change. Synthese Library, vol 151. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8482-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8482-0_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1277-6
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