Abstract
This theory deals with the case of n interacting democratic players, decision makers, or actors (n ≥ 3). Each actor can make a choice from a number of available strategies; for every actor, there is a payoff or result that corresponds with any given choice made by all the n actors. As with the two-person game, the result depends not only on one’s own decision, but also on the decisions of the other players. Also in this case, a distinction can be made between noncooperative and cooperative games.
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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishing
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Hanken, A.F.G., Reuver, H.A. (1981). Autonomous n-Person Systems and Dynamic Games. In: Social Systems and Learning Systems. Frontiers in Systems Research, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8132-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8132-4_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8134-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8132-4
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