Abstract
In Chapter II we saw that Moore’s opposition to the idealism summed up in the esse est percipi formula can be broken down into two different stages, the first certainly being over by 1905 and the second apparent by 1910 at the latest. This same two-staged division can be applied to Moore’s work on the subject-matter of the present chapter.
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Notes
Moore, ‘The Nature of Judgment’, p. 181.
Ibid., p. 177 and following.
Ibid.
Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968), p. 41.
Moore, ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, p. 17 and following.
Moore, The Nature of Judgment’, p. 179; also Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 7, 17, 191–193.
Moore, ‘Nature of Judgment’, pp. 177–179.
Ibid., p. 177.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 177, 193.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., and following.
Ibid., p. 184 and following.
Ibid., p. 179.
Ibid., p. 180.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 179.
Ibid., p. 182.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 56.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 60–61.
Ibid., p. 63; recall ‘Nature of Judgment’, p. 180.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 60.
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., pp. 62–65.
Ibid., p. 57.
See Chapter V, notes 13 and 15.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy, pp. 64–65.
Ibid., p. 63.
Ibid., p. 265.
Ibid., p. 309.
Ibid., p. 262.
Ibid., p. 265.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 56.
Ibid., p. 296.
Ibid., p. xii.
Moore, Tacts and Propositions’ (1927), p. 76.
Moore, ‘Propositions’ (circa 1948–1953), Commonplace Book, p. 375. In the lines quoted I do not think that Moore’s remark, “it is not true that if there were no instances of sentences no propositions could be believed” (Italics added.) necessarily means that Moore has reverted to the view that propositions are the objects of beliefs. It seems to me that the sentence quoted is better interpreted as a loose expression of the uncontroversial point that not infrequently we happen to believe or disbelieve what we understand or mean by some expression or other.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 290.
In Philosophical Papers: see pp. 104–106 especially. In this paper Moore argues for the point that references to actual existents are not the only proper kinds of references which can be made. Coupled with this position there is Moore’s rejection of the kind of rigid or scholastic application of Russell’s model of a definite description to disputes about genuine references made at the time by his fellow symposiasts, Ryle and Braithwaite. See also, Khatchadourian’s, Haig ‘Fictional Sentences’, Ratio XX, No. 2, December, 1978.
Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 291.
Relative to this see Linsky’s L. discussion of Meinong in Referring (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973), pp. 17–21. See also, Moore’s imaginary Objects’, p. 105 and his ‘The Conception of Reality’, Philosophical Studies, pp. 217–218.
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© 1982 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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O’Connor, D. (1982). The Status of Abstract Entities (I). In: The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7749-5_6
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