Common Sense in Metaphysics

Abstract

In the last chapter consideration was given to the philosophical background out of which Moore’s work emerged and in relation to which it must be viewed. We found Moore to have been critical of the British Empiricists in their perception of philosophy as mental science and, following an initial association with that school, of idealism too. Following that discussion we can now turn to consideration of a further dimension of Moore’s work, namely: the development of those positions in metaphysics which he himself would defend. In this chapter I will concentrate upon Moore’s use in philosophical matters of what he calls ‘common sense’. In subsequent chapters we will see how his analyses both of perceptual propositions and of propositions about abstract entities are connected to those defenses. For the present, however, our interest lies with the contribution made by those defenses themselves to what, in traditional terms, might be called philosophical problems about the external world. My consideration of Moore’s work in this chapter will consist of examination and appraisal of his arguments to prove¹ the existence of an enduring world independent of experience, and to justify our ordinary supposition that we possess certain knowledge of the existence of such a world. On both scores Moore’s arguments reduce to his reliance upon common knowledge and belief.