Synopsis
Induction is implicit as a crucial constituent in all scientific inference. A vindication is proposed which argues that only inductively based predictions are rational because they may succeed while any alternatively-based prediction is irrational because it must involve an arbitrary decision and is thus no better than a guess.
Accepting a predicting rule which is more complex than necessary to cover known facts, involves an arbitrary choice. Thus, a simplicity requirement must be written into the specification of induction as vindicated. This meets a number of problems that have beset induction.
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© 1982 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Clendinnen, F.J. (1982). Rational Expectation and Simplicity. In: McLaughlin, R. (eds) What? Where? When? Why?. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7731-0_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7731-0_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-7733-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7731-0
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