Abstract
The attempts to undermine the thesis about the rationality of science are well known in the history of philosophical thought and they still return, especially in periods when there is, in science (in its leading or basic disciplines) a need to rethink certain of its latent assumptions of the most general character, and when scientists feel clearly the necessity of dialogue with philosophers, or often when they try to ‘philosophize’ on their own.
Keywords
- Philosophical Thought
- Scientific Change
- Philosophical Concept
- Intellectual Content
- Rational Reconstruction
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© 1982 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Motycka, A. (1982). The Epistemological and Methodological Sense of the Concept of Rationality. In: Krajewski, W. (eds) Polish Essays in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7705-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7705-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1287-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7705-1
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